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Faculty and Deans

REVIEW ESSAY
Gender Justice and Its Critics
GENDER JUSTICE. By David L. Kirp, t Mark G. Yudof,t & Marlene
S. Franks.tt Univ. of Chicago Press 1986.
Reviewed by Neal Devins*

Four years ago, two essays that I authored on school desegregation
were published at approximately the same time. The first argued that
one must consider community desires as well as legal principle when
fashioning a desegregation remedy. 1 The other criticized the Reagan
Department of Justice for misinterpreting Supreme Court doctrine in this
area. 2 A short time after each piece was published, I confronted one of
the harsh realities of working on such a highly charged topic: People not
only care, they take it personally. Acquaintances on both extremes of the
political spectrum shunned me. While liberals thought my "community
desires" article validated racism, conservatives considered my Justice
Department piece an overt attack on the administration.
David Kirp, Mark Yudof, and Marlene Strong Franks, the authors
of Gender Justice, are probably undergoing a shnilar experience. Over
the past two years, their book has been harshly criticized by reviewers in
the Georgetown Law Journal, 3 the Yale Law Journal, 4 the Texas Law

t Professor in The Graduate School of Public Policy and Lecturer in The School of Law at
The University of California, Berkeley.
t Dean, University of Texas Law School and holder of The James A. Elkins Centennial
Chair in Law.
U Policy Analyst completing her Ph.D. in public policy at The University of California,
Berkeley.
• Assistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, MarshallWythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982,
Vanderbilt Law School. I would like to thank Ruth Calker, Alan Fuchs, Bob Fullinwider, Paul
LeBel, and Lois Weithorn for their comments on an earlier draft. All mistakes are my own. A
summer research grant from the College of William and Mary helped support my work on this
essay.
1. Devins, Integration and Local Politics (Book Review), 73 PuB. INT. 175 (Fall 1983).
2. Devins, Closing the Classroom Door on Civil Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. 26 (Winter 1984).
3. Burns, Apologia for the Status Quo (Book Review), 74 GEO. L.J. 1791 (1986).
4. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice (Book Review),
96 YALE L.J. 914 {1987).
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Review, 5 and the Berkeley Women's Law Journal. 6 No positive scholarly
criticism has yet been published. 7
Why the negative reviews? Is the book so terrible that it should be
panned? I think not. I find Gender Justice, while not faultless, reasonable and well done. Its critics, I think, have decided to kill the messenger
because they don't like the message, namely, that ·~ustice means enhancing choice for individuals, securing fair process rather than particular
outcomes for the community" (p. 12). The book's "liberty-enhancing
model" 8 surely does not sit well with those who perceive that freedom of
choice is impossible for many members of society. Indeed, the principal
concern of the reviewers has been to demonstrate the model's failure to
respond adequately to pervasive gender inequality.
I do not dispute the feminists' 9 critiques of the liberty-enhancing
model. 10 At the same time, I think the feminist reviews of Gender Justice
are unfair; they attack the book largely for what it is not, and thus overlook many of the authors' valuable insights. 11 This review attempts a
more equitable approach by placing the book and its critics in the larger
context of feminist jurisprudence. In so doing, it assesses the book's success in advancing a coherent model of gender equality.
My purpose then is not to advance the liberty-enhancing model as
the answer to all gender questions. Rather, I will evaluate the book's
application of that model and demonstrate that it provides a useful and
invigorating way to examine gender classifications. In the end, however,
I find the book stimulating yet disappointing. While the book provides a
5. Fishkin, Libeny and Sexual Equality (Book Review), 65 TEX. L. REV. 1441 (1987).
6. Menkel-Meadow, Gendered Justice (Book Review), 2 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 258
(1986).
7. Gender Justice has fared somewhat better in the popular press. See Schwarzschild, Liberty
and Autonomy for All, N.Y. Times, June IS, 1986, § 7 (Book Review), at 27. But see Gordon,
Feminist Rhetoric and Academic Skirmishes, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1986, (Bookworld), at 10; Tong,
Liberty. Equality- Community? (Book Review), WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS, Jan. 1986, at I.
8. The liberty-enhancing model deviates somewhat from the classic liberal vision of the
nineteenth century. For example, the authors at one point argue that "[i]n a just world, we would
not only remove baniers but also give support, for liberty has no appeal when it promises only the
freedom to starve" (p. 21).
9. Throughout this review, I refer to the ever-growing and diverse body of feminist
jurisprudence. See infra notes 17-75 and accompanying text. Occasionally, however, I use the
generic phrase "feminists." I do so not to describe feminism as a single way of thinking, but rather
to contrast that wide-ranging body that constitutes feminist thinking with those who disagree with
all feminists.
10. This is not to say that I agree with these feminist interpretations. Instead, I think that one
need not repudiate this vision to find Gender Justice worthwhile.
11. Rather than consider Gender Justice on its own terms and evaluate the book within the
context of the liberty-enhancing model, the reviewers focus their criticisms on the authors' equation
of justice with choice and fair process. Nevertheless, many of the reviewers' narrow criticisms are
well taken, particularly those expressed by Lucinda Finley. See Finley, supra note 4; see also infra
notes 78-109.
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provocative conceptual framework to explore gender issues, the authors'
endorsement of liberalism-and with it the foundations underlying their
liberty-enhancing model-ultimately is superficial.
This review is divided into four Parts. Part I describes Gender Justice's liberty-enhancing model. Part II considers the book's place in feminist thought. Part III evaluates the feminist criticisms of the book.
Finally, Part IV presents my assessment of the book.
. I
GENDER JUSTICE DESCRIBED 12

When it comes to gender, activists on both the left and the right
believe that government should play an instrumental role in implementing their particular vision of social justice. On the right, naturalists consider gender-specific identities a biological imperative and advocate the
use of government resources to encourage traditional sex roles (pp. 5357). On the left, the more politically active feminists seek governmentmandated equality (of earnings, of childrearing, and other familial
responsibilities) to overcome pernicious sexism (pp. 48-53, 58-61).
These extreme visions mischaracterize differences in status and
treatment between men and women (pp. 61-65). Nevertheless, genderrelated policies often advance one of these visions. Denial of federal
abortion funds and the marital tax deduction further the naturalist model
(pp. 108-11). Maternity leave requirements and comparable worth proposals advance the feminist vision (pp. 168, 190). The viability of these
policies exemplifies the central dilemma in this area-the perception that
the status of women is explained by either biology or discrimination and
acquiescence to biologically defined gender roles.
Gender Justice seeks to solve this dilemma. Rather than supporting
social outcomes based on paradigms rooted in the belief that either biology or sexism defines women's role in society, Gender Justice stresses the
primacy of self-determination. 13 The authors' view is that "justice means
enhancing choice for individuals . . . ." (p. 12). Consequently, the
authors generally endorse public policies that either protect or encourage
free choice, while criticizing those policies designed to produce particular
outcomes.
The authors premise their embrace of the liberty-enhancing model
on the belief that "[i]ndividuals can usually best decide what is in their
best interests, because they are the ones with the greatest incentives to
12. For a fuller description of the book, see Finley, supra note 4, at 914-23.
13. A healthy dose of distrust of governmental intervention is closely tied to this embrace of
liberty-enhancing public policy. For -example, in rejecting feminist proposals to have government
transform gender roles, the authors argue that "[w)hat is remarkable about this litany is the implicit
expectation that anyone, let alone government, might accomplish all those things ..•" (p. 125).
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weigh highly personalized costs and benefits." (p. 21). Their model is
consistent with the principle of equal opportunity, which holds that persons of equal ability and motivation should have equal chances to achieve
their personal life plans (pp. 22, 105). 14 Viewed in the abstract, men and
women must be deemed similarly situated since both are capable of
choice. As a result, the authors argue that men and women should have
the freedom to make choices and exercise opportunities without regard
to gender.
In arguing for gender-neutral policies, the authors emphasize that
individual choice and ability are instrumental in determining outcomes.
Consequently, result-oriented feminists are wrong to conclude that freedom of choice alone does not lead to just results. Contending that "variations between the sexes are attributable, not just to noxious
discrimination, but also to factors such as personal taste and voluntary
obligations" (p. 27), the authors criticize result-oriented feminists: "To
insist ... that a world where some women stay in their homes and raise
children is an unjust world implies that those women have made the
wrong choice . . . . [O]n what moral basis can anyone stand outside as
judge, condemning the mothers for their decision?" (p. 22).
Like the outcome-based ideologies it criticizes, however, Gender
Justice proceeds on a conception of women in society. In advancing the
free-choice model, the authors underscore the traditional treatment and
current condition of women, including a discussion of the historic segregation of women in public policy. Using as examples both protective
labor laws (mandating minimum wages and maximum work periods) and
laws specifying that husbands administer their wives' assets, they conclude that "women were victimized by policies designed to protect
them-policies that, for this very reason, denied them the chance to
make basic decisions for themselves" (p. 29). The authors emphasize
that, in contrast to such "benevolent" legislation, remedial acts such as
the prohibition of sex-based discrimination in employment contained in
the 1964 Civil Rights Act 15 and the Equal Pay Act 16 have enabled
women to make substantial inroads in the male-dominated marketplace
(pp. 158, 171). Although acknowledging that discrimination still contributes to the earnings gap between men and women, Gender Justice
concludes that discrimination is less significant than in the past and is but
one of many sociological factors affecting gender equality (pp. 142-53).
The authors, as noted, do not dismiss the wage gap. They note that
14. According to the authors, "[h]onoring individual choice ultimately enables the individual
to define his or her own identity in one of its most fundamental aspects" (p. 22). See also Bell, On
Meritocracy and Equality, 29 PUB. INT. 29 (1972).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
16. 29 u.s.c. § 206 (1985).
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past discriminatory practices and employee choice have created "distinct
career lines with different rewards for men and women" (p. 145), and
thus they advocate government leadership in developing recruitment and
training programs to encourage women to enter male-dominated professions (p. 165). 17 Unlike quotas-which in their view treat individuals as
interchangeable units-such programs recognize the primacy of individual autonomy (p. 136). 18 These programs would ensure that men and
women are treated equally in the public sphere of work and commuuity
(pp. 166-72). With respect to the private sphere of home and family,
Gender Justice asserts that government generally should not interfere
with private choices (pp. 81, 201). 19
Using individual liberty as a benchmark, the authors consider many
other gender-related issues, including sex-based variances in the computation of actuarial tables (acceptable because they reflect a biological truism) (pp. 3-4), the marital tax deduction (unacceptable because it
rewards the traditional family at the expense of alternative family
arrangements) (pp. 186-90), the abolition of gender-specific minimum
wage laws (acceptable because it protects a woman's right to compete
equally for jobs) (p. 119), and the exclusion of women from draft registration (unacceptable because women and men should be equally obligated to defend the nation) (pp. 104-05). Because the authors' principal
inquiry is whether choice is unjustifiably restricted, Gender Justice is able
to move quickly from issue to issue.
Gender Justice's liberty-enhancing model differs substantially from
Supreme Court approaches to sex discrimination. Since 1976, the Court
has applied so-called "middle tier" review to gender-based distinctions,
requiring that such policies "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."20 When applying this standard, however, the Court has often
adopted a deterministic vision of gender equality and insisted that gen17. Similarly, the authors support programs encouraging men to enter traditionally female
professions. Gender Justice offers the following model for effective gender-based policy: "Removing
the formal impediments to volition, securing the basic requisites of choice, [and] encouraging
tolerance for the divergent choices of others ... will lead to change" (p. 28).
18. The authors state that "quotas withhold from individuals the right of self-determination
that is critical for self-respect" (p. 136).
19. According to the authors, "[t]he public sphere is the world of political and economic
affairs, the private sphere refers to relationships in which personal satisfactions or interests, not the
public good, are determinative" (p. 17).
20. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma law prohibiting sale of
beer to males under 21, while permitting such sales to 18-year-old females). See generally Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 20-37 (1972) (explaining the Court's
abandonment of a two-tier model of equal protection doctrine by adding an intermediate or "middle
tier" approach in the early 1970s).
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der-based classifications conform to perceived biological differences. 21
Thus, male-only draft registration is appropriate because Congress has
determined that women are physically disadvantaged and therefore
should be ineligible for combat duty. 22 Similarly, criminalizing sexual
relations with a minor female, but not a minor male, correctly recognizes
that women and men are "not similarly situated with respect to the
problems and risks of sexual intercourse.'m In commenting on this naturalist emphasis on real sex differences, Anne Freedman has written:
"The adjective 'real' implies not only that these differences are caused by
nature or biology, but also that the impact of sex differences on people's
lives is natural and inevitable, rather than culturally determined. " 24
The Court's validation of special treatment programs endorsed by
many feminists appears equally deterministic. An example is its recent
approval of a qualified right to reinstatement in conjunction with unpaid
pregnancy leave. 25 While emphasizing that "a State could not mandate
special treatment of pregnant workers based on stereotypes or generalizations about their needs and abilities," 26 the Court upheld a law allowing
female employees up to four months to recover from childbirth. 27
Undoubtedly, the allowance for such extended leave was premised on the
view that women-but not men-need a sufficient period of time to reorganize their lives as parents and workers. The Court's special treatment
of women has been attacked by some scholars as reinforcing the cultural
norm of women as homemakers. Professor Wendy Williams, for example, criticizes "feminists who seek special recognition for pregnancy,"28
since "[m]aternity leave was always based upon cultural constructs and
ideologies rather than upon biological necessity, upon role expectations
rather than irreducible differences between the sexes." 29
21. See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE
L.J. 913, 922-43 (1983) (tracing concept of "real" sex differences in Rehnquist-Stewart approach).
22. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981) ("'The principle that women should not
intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental. .. .' ") (quoting S. REP. No. 826, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1980)).
23. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981).
24. Freedman, supra note 21, at 945.
25. See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (upholding
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
26. Id. at 691 n.17.
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). But cj Wimberly v. Labor and Indus.
Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987) (state may disqualify unemployment compensation
claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy, because the statutory coverage excludes all
claimants who leave their jobs for reasons not causally connected to their work or their employers).
See generally Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 38-43 (1987) (arguing
that Wimberly was based on a male standard whereas California Federal did not rely on genderbased presumptions).
28. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7
WoMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 195 (1982) [hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis].
29. Id. at 197.
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Gender Justice is highly critical of so-called naturalist and feminist
visions. In order to depart from deterministic se~-·stereotyping, the
authors suggest that the Court adopt a two-part test in which it considers: (1) whether a gender-based classification serves to sustain autonomy
or reduce liberty by maintaining historical distinctions; and (2) whether
there exists a less gender-specific alternative (p. 101). 30
One of the most striking features of this liberty-enhancing model is
the authors' recognition that gender-based policy no longer can ignore
classifications that are harmful to men. They advocate the father's right
to be informed of the mother's wish for an abortion (p. 111), the right of
husbands to be eligible for alimony (p. 102), and the impropriety of the
presumption-sometimes used in custody battles-that the mother is
better able to care for her child than is the father (pp. 183-85).
By applying the free-choice model equally to men and women, the
authors also distinguish gender justice from racial justice. Contrasting
the paternalistic "benefit motivation" of gender-based classifications with
the invidious oppression of blacks by whites, they argue that their analysis should not be applied to racial policy (p. 87). 31 With respect to race,
"where 'different' is almost always a euphemism for 'worse' " (p. 87),
equality means indistinguishability. In contrast, Kirp, Yudof, and
Franks consider indistinguishability a poor formula for gender equality.
Their preferred constitutional approach treats gender equality "as securing equal liberty and equal rights of public participation for men and
women" (p. 87).
While preferring that government perform a limited role in transforming gender roles, Gender Justice does not repudiate state involvement. The authors recognize that government "cannot avoid affecting
men's and women's choices" (p. 129); however, they advance a host of
reform proposals designed to reduce government-imposed gender distinctions. These include providing federal funds for childcare to give parents
flexibility in selecting the appropriate mix between work and home (pp.
190-94) and the adoption of an individually based tax system that does
30. In applying this equal liberty principle, Kirp, Yudof, and Franks take issue with numerous
Supreme Court decisions. Noting that women can at least carry out noncombat duty, they dispute
the holding ofRostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), because it signifies women's diminished civic
role (pp. 104-05). The authors' criticism is not confined to case outcomes, but extends equally to the
Court's reasoning. Consequently, they take issue with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), a
case insisting on sexually diverse jury rolls because "a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded." Id. at 532. The authors argue that the case turned on stereotypical gender differences:
The Court inappropriately emphasized the "distinct quality" of women, rather than premising its
decision on civic responsibility as an essential element of liberty and respect (pp. 103-04).
31. Indeed, the authors suggest that greater government intervention may be necessary to
overcome the consequences of historic racial discrimination (p. 137).
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not encourage certain types of familial relationships over others (pp. 18690).32
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks never insist, however, that the government
remain completely gender neutral. They endorse "benign" discrimination when it is truly remedial and thus liberty enhancing. Accordingly,
Social Security Act provisions favoring women are permissible because
they respond to historic discrimination that reduced women's earnings
and forced them into early retirement (pp. 102-03). 33 The authors also
advocate differences in treatment which respond to biological sex differences. Unlike the Supreme Court's approach, which permits gender distinctions substantially related to important government objectives,
Gender Justice's authors would permit nonremedial distinctions only
when based on immutable sex differences. For example, the computation
of actuarial tables may take into account statistical disparities between
the life expectancies of men and women (p. 114). In contrast, sex-based
variances in auto insurance rates are rejected because such "[s]ex-based
differentials create categories from which careful men cannot escape and
which benefit reckless women" (p. 114).
The authors are not uncompromising in their emphasis on choice.
They apparently approve of some gender classifications in the name of
fiscal expedience. This exception assumes that if a sexual stereotype is
almost universally true, reliance upon it will not be demeaning. For
example, in determining whether wives-but not husbands-are given
military dependents' benefits without proof of their dependence, the
authors view as a toss-up the conflicting concerns of administrative convenience (since the husband is chief breadwinner in almost ninety percent
of military households) and sexual stereotyping (since such presumptions
reinforce women's status as secondary wage earners) (p. 115).
II
GENDER JUSTICE AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

Gender Justice pays little attention to the burgeoning body of feminist jurisprudence.34 Instead, the authors debunk two jurisprudential
32. The authors also propose modifying social security retirement benefits to recognize
women's dual responsibilities at home and in the market (pp. 195-99).
33. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). The authors also support sexbased classifications in education, arguing that sex-segregated schools often enhance choice. The
authors therefore disagree with a 1982 Supreme Court ruling which required a state-run nursing
school to admit men. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Contending
that the real issue is the impact of the school admission policy on plaintiff's life choices, the authors
feel that the majority erred in its absolutist view that such sex-segregation "perpetuate[s] the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." !d. at 729 (p. 106).
34. Several critics have attacked the book for presenting an oversimplistic view of feminist
thinking. See Burns, supra note 3, at 1793 ("The authors virtually ignore the more interesting and
productive source of contrasts and comparisons available in emerging feminist legal theory .•..");

HeinOnline -- 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1384 1988

1988)

GENDER JUSTICE

1385

caricatures-"naturalists" and "leftist feminists." This oversimplification serves the authors well. Their purpose is not to offer a comprehensive critique of thinking on gender policy, but rather to contrast their
liberty-enhancing theory with deterministic visions on both extremes of
the political spectrum. 35 Some understanding of the richness of feminist
thinking, however, is necessary to appreciate Gender Justice and its critics. Three approaches dominate feminist thinking: equality, special
treatment, and inequality. 36 This Part separately considers each of these
models.

A.

Equality

The equality approach most closely resembles the liberty-enhancing
model advanced in Gender Justice. Grounded in mid-seventies efforts to
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment37 and push for heightened judicial
review in gender cases, equality proponents speak of "the nation's moral
and legal commitment to a system in which women and men stand as full
see also Finley, supra note 4, at 915 ("[T]he work seems barely touched by the recent profusion of
feminist writings on gender issues.").
35. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks argue that the common underlying weakness of naturalist and
leftist feminist paradigms is that they "stress what happens to women, rather than attributing to
them any significant part in shaping their circumstances" (p. 63).
36. See generally Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1142-63 (1986) (summarizing the equality/special
treatment debate in the context of critiquing equality theory); Note, Childbearing and Childrearing:
Feminists and Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 1145 (1987) (examining the theoretical debate over social
policies). Other feminist perspectives include antisubordination, equal acceptance, and
communitarian theories. See Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986) (antisubordination); Littleton, Restructuring Sexual Equality, 75
CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (equal acceptance); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) (communitarian).
Many feminists also subscnbe to Carol Gilligan's notion that gender defines the approaches
taken by men and women to resolve moral and legal problems. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982). Those promoting this feminist approach, known as the "ethic of care," seek "a
community and a judiciary that relies on nurturant, caring, loving, empathic values rather than
exclusively on the rule of reason ...•" West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 65
(1988); see also Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms? (Book Review), 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1559, 1568 (1987) (arguing that an ethic of care methodology "supplants the formal and
abstract thinking entailed in the liberal ethic of justice and rights with an approach to moral
problems that is contextual and narrative"). While feminists like Bartlett, Sherry, and West make
use of Gilligan's theory, other feminists worry that the attnlmtes of the ethic of care are male-defined
and hence capable of serving as a "mechanism for keeping women from true knowledge or good
theory by limiting them to 'feminine' modes of discourse." Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A
Preliminary Inquiry into the Policies ofAuthenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 243 (1988);
see a/so C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987) (Gilligan's theory reinforces women's
powerlessness).
37. The substantive section of the Equal Rights Amendment reads: "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex." H.R.J.
Res. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1983); S.J. Res. 10, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 129 CoNG. REC.
5529-30 (1983).
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and equal individuals under the law." 38 Its chief contemporary proponent is Professor Wendy Williams. According to Williams, "sex-based
generalizations are generally impermissible whether derived from physical differences such as size and strength, from cultural role assignments
such as breadwinner or homemaker, or from some combination of innate
and ascribed characteristics, such as the greater longevity of the average
woman compared to the average man." 39 In language strikingly similar
to that in Gender Justice, she claims that "a dual system of rights inevitably produces gender hierarchy and, more fundamentally, treats women
and men as statistical abstractions rather than as persons with individual
capacities, inclinations and aspirations-at enormous cost to women and
not insubstantial cost to men." 40 Consequently, Williams fears that the
state may "lay claim to an interest in women's special procreational
capacity"41 and thus argues against special rules for pregnancy-related
disabilities. 42 Instead, she advocates comprehensive disability plans that
provide equally for men and women. By refusing to label early childrearing as an exclusively feminine domain, Williams hopes to encourage
greater male involvement in childrearing.43
Gender Justice similarly views special maternity benefits as "the latest version of paternalism, with all its debilitating consequences for working women" (p. 41). However, the book's formulation departs
substantially from that offered by Williams. Whereas Williams insists
that any rule having a disparate effect on one sex be reasonably necessary
to business operations,44 Kirp, Yudof, and Franks suggest no such limitation when disparate impact is rooted in choice. In the case of pregnancy, application of the liberty-enhancing model is not necessarily
inconsistent with gender-based classifications, since "[u]nlike other disa38. Ginsberg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1915 SUP. Cr. REV. 1,
24. These mid-seventies litigation efforts-undertaken principally by the American Civil Liberties
Union-"sought to show that women were similarly situated, but that society had treated them
differently because of stereotypical 'old notions' and 'archaic assumptions' about sex roles." Cole,
Strategies ofDifference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 33,
55 (1984). See also Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 603-15 (defending the ideals of equality theorists) (1977).
39. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. i... & Soc. CHANGE 325, 329 (1984-1985) [hereinafter Williams, Equality's
Riddle].
40. Id. at 329-30.
41. Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 28, at'l96.
42. ld. Professor Williams further justifies her position by arguing that: (1) treating pregnancy
as a special case allows for both unfavorable and favorable treatment; (2) focusing on pregnancy
draws attention away from the larger concern of reforming disability programs; and (3) favorable
treatment of pregnancy increases the costs of hiring women and therefore may ultimately harm
women's economic position. Id.
43. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 39, at 354-55.
44. See id. at 331-32 (following approach of disparate-impact title VII analysis).
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bilities ... pregnancy is usually voluntary and welcomed .... " (p. 109).45
Moreover, Gender Justice's liberty-enhancing model also differs from the
Williams' disparate-impact model by accepting gender-based rules rooted
in administrative convenience or alleged natural sex differences. 46

B.

Special Treatment

Gender Justice departs more substantially from the work of special
treatment feminists Herma Hill Kay and Sylvia Law~ Professor Kay
argues that biological, reproductive sex differences should be legally significant only in the context of procreation-related activities.47 For Kay,
equality analysis "does not adequately solve the legal problems raised by
reproductive differences, primarily because the comparison between men
and women does not fit those cases."48 As a result, she endorses genderspecific laws that require the granting of extended maternity leave,
because such laws ensure equal employment opportunity by recognizing
immutable differences between men and women. 49 For similar reasons,
Kay implies that equality analysis fails in cases involving printed warnings on cigarette packages about the dangers of smoking during pregnancy, court orders that safeguard fetal development against maternal
neglect, and access to abortions by indigent women. so
Professor Law's model varies slightly from Kay's approach in that it
concentrates solely on laws impeding female reproductive freedom. 51
Rather than having courts limit special treatment to instances where
there are procreation-related differences between men and women, Professor Law-apparently unconcerned with laws impeding male reproduc45. The authors do recognize, however, that complicated childbirth operations, as contrasted
with the costs of normal pregnancy which "the ordinary family" can plan for, should be included in
disability plans (p. 109).
46. For an equality-based criticism of these features of the liberty-enhancing model, see infra
notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
47. Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1, 22
(1985) [hereinafter Kay, Equality and Difference}. Professor Kay argues that "biological
reproductive sex differences are not comparable to other traits or characteristics that are shared by
both sexes, and cannot adequately be analyzed within a framework that turns on differential
treatment of two comparable groups." /d. at 33. Consequently, she proposes conceptualizing the
debate in terms of an "episodic analysis" which limits the legal significance of reproductive sex
differences to pregnancy. /d.
48. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39, 87 [hereinafter Kay, Models of
Equality}. The special treatment model is comparable to die equality approach in its treatment of
risks to fertility that men and women share equally, such as exposure to toxic materials. According
to Kay, such risks do not justify differences in treatment. /d. at 85.
49. Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 47, at 20-38. For the equality critique of this
proposition, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
SO. Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 83-84.
51. See Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984)(arguing for
a stronger focus on biological reproductive differences). .
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tive freedom 52-proposes that courts reviewing the constitutionality of
laws governing reproductive biology53 ensure that "(1) the law has no
significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom or (2) if the
law has this impact, it is justified as the best means of serving a compelling state purpose." 54 In advancing her proposal, Law emphasizes the
judiciary's inability to distinguish between biology and its accompanying
social consequences. 55
By viewing pregnancy as "voluntary," Gender Justice's libertyenhancing model is not sympathetic to the underlying concern of special
treatment advocates. Like the equality theorists, Kirp, Yudof, and
Franks view gender-based maternity leave as harmful paternalism (p.
140). At the same time, the liberty-enhancing model recognizes that
Congress should provide funds for medically necessary abortions when
government offers "men and women every other kind of medically essential treatment" (p. 11 0). 56 Finally, Gender Justice is not insensitive to the
needs of working mothers, but-like the equality model-its proposed
solution is to offer parental benefits to both men and women.
It is important to note that the liberty-enhancing, equality, and special treatment models all share a strong belief in individual decisionmaking. 57 The ultimate objective of all models is to ensure the fair treatment
of men and women in the public sphere. 58 While the special treatment
model is built around the special circumstances of pregnancy, it is generally highly critical of gender-based decisionmaking. Indeed, Professor
Law refuses to extend her model beyond reproductive biology-believing
instead that constitutional adjudication in this area should simply seek
52. See Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 84-85 (discussing Law's method for
analyzing statutes regulating reproductive biology).
53. Law contrasts regulation concerning reproductive biology with legislation that reflects sexbased classifications, such as those "based on what the government perceives to be the ability and
willingness of certain citizens to care for children .... " Law, supra note 51, at 1034 (compariug
statute requiring women to inform sexual partner of her pregnancy with statute providing child care
leave to nursing mothers).
54. Id. at 1008-09.
55. Id. at 1002-13. Professor Law criticizes cases in which the Court relied on sex stereotypes
of male aggression and male combat-readiness in order to underscore her view that attention to
differences should be limited to laws implicating reproductive biology and to legislation which may
negatively affect women. Id. at 1014 n.217.
56. For further discussion of abortion-funding decisions, see id. at 985 n.15.
57. See generally Finley, supra note 36, at 1159-63.
58. Differences among the models then are best understood as little more than the use of
varying means to accomplish similar objectives. Williams' insistence upon "pure" equality, for
example, is principally based on her belief that special treatment accommodation will ultimately
harm the social and economic status of women. See Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 28, at
196-97. Moreover, Williams believes that "pure" equality is within reach. See Williams, Equality's
Riddle. supra note 39, at 380. For an examination of the "pure" version of equality, see Van Alstine,
Rights of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979).

HeinOnline -- 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1388 1988

1988]

GENDER JUSTICE

1389

"formal comparative equality with its relatively more reliable standards. " 59 All three models, therefore, reflect the liberal vision that society be built around rules equally applicable to men and women. Gender
Justice, "[b]y opting for process over outcome, ... value[s] self-determination over collective determinations of sex roles" (p. 12). Equality theory similarly speaks of "a commitment to a vision of the human
condition which seeks to uncover commonalty rather than difference." 60
Finally, special treatment advocates claim that "where reproductive sex
differences are not at issue ... one can compare women and men without
distortion. " 61
C.

Inequality

Inequality theory rejects the propositions that individual choice in
the free market is the true measure of justice and that the private (home)
and public (work) spheres are distinct. Inequality theorists consider
these presumptions fuel for male-dominated norms which deny a distinct
feminine identity and set "being like a man" as the outer bounds of a
woman's potential. According to Lucinda Finley, "[t]he role of men in
defining the standard of normalcy and in assigning significance to female
differences, means that the whole premise of our equality jurisprudence is
whatever is male is the norm." 62
Catherine MacKinnon is the leading proponent of the inequality
model. She argues that the inequality approach "is marked by the understanding that sex discrimination is a system that defines women as inferior from men, that cumnlatively disadvantages women for their
59. Law, supra note 51, at 1012.
60. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 39, at 326.
61. Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 87.
62. Finley, supra note 36, at 1155. Recent articles by Martha Minow, Ann Scales, Christine
Littleton, and Robin West espouse a similar vision. Professor Minow argues that the work of
leading feminists "exposes the dominance in field after field of conceptions of human nature that take
a male as the reference point and treat women as 'other,' 'different,' 'deviant,' 'exceptional,' or
baffling. Feminist work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both the use of
male measures and the assumption that women fail by them." Minow, supra note 27, at 61 (footnote
omitted). Professor Minow also notes that to avoid applying one particular view to stand for all
women, feminists must also consider race and class in any account of gender relations. See id. at 63.
For Professor Scales, the underlying philosophical basis of the legal system has "made maleness the
norm of what is human, and [has done) so sub rosa, all in the name of neutrality." Scales, The
Emergence ofFeminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1377 (1986); see also id. at 1394
(arguing that the law must focus on the effects of male domination rather than on the differences
between the sexes). Professor West aptly summarizes this feminist critique: "The human being
assumed or constituted by legal theory precludes the woman described by feminism." West, supra
note 36, at 42. This is wrong. Echoing this perception, Professor Littleton argues that male
domination-or "phallocentrism"-has "created a self-referencing system by which those things
culturally identified as 'male' are more highly valued than those identified as 'female'.... " Littleton,
supra note 36, at 1280.
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differences from men, as well as ignores their similarities." 63 Correlatively, she criticizes liberal visions, proclaiming that "it is not only lies
and blindness that have kept women down. It is as much the social creation of differences, and the transformation of differences into social
advantages and disadvantages, upon which inequality can rationally be
predicated. " 64
This pervasiveness of male domination makes the application of
rules impossible, for when the state "is most ruthlessly neutral, it will be
most male; when it is most sex blind, it will be most blind to the sex of
the standard being applied." 65 Since neutrality and male dominance are
inseparable, the liberal vision of choice is therefore impossible. Because
of liberal transgressions, MacKinnon views as objectionable discrimination policies or practices that contribute to "the maintenance of an
underclass or a deprived position because of gender status." 66
The inequality model likewise rejects liberal distinctions between
public and private spheres. This rejection is best illustrated by Frances
Olsen. 67 Claiming that this dichotomy treats "[a]ctual inequality and
domination in the family . . . as private matters that the state did not
bring about," 68 Professor Olsen argues that men have retained "excessive" power both by restricting state regulation of the family and by
using the state's coercive power "to reinforce and consolidate their
63. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 116 (1979). For an excellent liberal critique of this book, see Taub, Book Review,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686 (1980).
64. C. MACKINNON, supra note 63, at 105.
65. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,
8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983). Similarly, Lucinda Finley argues that the absence of values such as
interconnectedness and care in our system of rights reflects the male experience:
It is the male aspect of human experience because men are generally removed from bodily
concerns such as preparing food for the table and assuring clean clothes in the drawer, and
have been removed from human experiences that can foster a sense of interconnectedness,
such as birth and childrearing. Thus, it is much easier for men to conceive of themselves as
disconnected, autonomous beings.
Finley, supra note 36, at 1161. See also Freedman, supra note 21 (arguing that equality analysis,
based upon perceived "natural" sex differences, is often used to uphold discriminating laws); Note,
Toward a Redefinition ofSexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487, 495 (1981) ("the idea that sexual
equality means assimilating women into the status quo [has) blocked the courts' view of changes in
the status quo that might help make room for women").
66. C. MACKINNON, supra note 63, at 117.
67. See Olsen, 17ze Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 1497 (1983). Olsen writes that "[t)he state as it now exists must be ended at the same time
that civil society as it now exists is ended; and when we transform the contemporary family, we must
simultaneously transform the market." Id. at 1568. See also Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on
Women s Subordination and the Role ofLaw, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 117, 118-22 (D. Kairys ed.
1982) (arguing that the limits the law places on female participation in the public sphere, coupled
with the nearly complete absence of law in the private sphere, operates to promote male dominance
in society); Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (rejecting
separate-sphere approach because of historic state encroachment on the family).
68. Olsen, supra note 67, at 1506.
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authority over wives and children." 69 Liberal solutions such as the
recognition of marital property70 and no-fault divorce71 are considered
inadequate to correct this power imbalance. Such solutions either "foster
individual selfishness" or "legitimate actual inequality by individualizing
and particularizing it." 72 The solution, therefore, is not "to patch up and
refine the liberal theory of the state," but to "challenge and disintegrate
it."73
Inequality theorists also offer a pragmatic critique of the liberal
vision. For example, pointing to the competing cost-benefit framework
of the equal treatment-special treatment debate, Lucinda Finley argues
that both positions fail due to their reliance on the liberal doctrinal
framework: "[T]he [liberal] theory of equality and the legal analysis that
implements the theory cannot tell us how to define or identify what is a
relevant difference and what is a relevant similarity in any given situation."74 Finley also argues that the liberal theorists' emphasis on autonomy limits reform, for the conception of detached autonomy as selfdefinition "is challenged by the recoguition that our desires and values
are often socially constructed."75 By focusing on the individual, therefore, the liberal vision gives short shrift to features of human development emphasized by feminists.
Inequality theory and the liberty-enhancing model advanced in Gender Justice are clearly irreconcilable.76 Inequality writers view the liberal
69. Id. at 1510.
70. ld. at 1540.
71. ld. at 1534.
72. ld. at 1560. Compare Note, supra note 65, at 502 ("[l]f raising children and, say, drafting
contracts were compensated equally (in money and status), women who will not or cannot adopt the
typical male role of minimal parental responsibility would not be economically handicapped.").
73. Olsen, supra note 67, at 1562. See also Finley, supra note 36, at 1163 ("A central aspect of
the [gender hierarchy] problem that eludes equality analysis is the maintenance of separate spheres
of work and horne ..••"). It is also worth noting that feminist theorists are not the only group
rejecting the liberal dichotomy between public and private spheres. The New Right, as Professor
Law points out, seeks to replace this dichotomy with "a culturally and legally enforced ideal of the
patriarchal family." Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law, 95 YALE L.J. 1769, 1778
(1986).
74. Finley, supra note 36, at 1149.
75. Id. at 1161.
76. Nevertheless, the sweeping rejection of liberalism by inequality theorists is probably overly
broad. Liberalism takes on many forms, including some that at least potentially reject the notion
that men and women are now ready to compete equally. John Rawls' emphasis on fair equality of
opportunity, for example, recognizes that "those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and
have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their
initial place in the social system ...." J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF Jus·ncE 73 (1971). According to
Rawls, "[t]he consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires us to view persons
independently from the influences of their social position." Id. at 511. If fair outcomes are
predicated on the existence of a fair process, then inequalities that influence social position must be
taken into account. While admitting that Rawls himself has only "barely hinted at" applying his
theories to feminist jurisprudence, Susan Okin has argued that "a consistent and wholehearted
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definition of choice and the separation between public and private
spheres as male constructs and sources of male domination. For inequality writers, "[t]he liberal humanist goal of protecting 'the untrammelled
exercise of capacities central to human rationality' not only does not
apply to disenabled persons, but often requires the systematic deprivation
of the freedom of others.'m Kirp, Yudof, and Franks dismiss this viewpoint as failing to attribute to women any significant role in shaping their
environment (p. 63). In advancing the liberty-enhancing model, they
make this classic liberal argument: "By opting for our own plan of life
rather than imaginiug it imposed on us, we engage in a uniquely human
enterprise that expresses our moral dignity" (p. 64). Needless to say, this
formulation does not sit well with inequality visionaries. They see this
formulation as problematic in a world where, they maintain, the individual will is often shaped by social conditioning and context.

III
GENDER JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS

Scholarly criticism of Gender Justice must be understood in its context. The ferocity of the book's critics derives in large part from their
rejection of the book's acceptance of the liberal vision. Lucinda Finley/8
Sarah Burns/9 and Carrie Menkel-Meadow 80 assess the book in a manner often analogous to the inequality model's critique of liberalism.
James Fishkin argues that the authors' complete faith in the process
approach cannot be justified when these procedures produce systematic
patterns of unequal outcomes. 81 For the most part, these criticisms fail
to evaluate Gender Justice's actual application of the liberty-enhancing
model, but concentrate instead on criticizing the model itself. Indeed,
much of the criticism of Gender Justice concerns the book that the
authors should have written rather than the one that they did write. It is
thus important to explore how the reviewers approach gender issues
from a perspective different from Gender Justice's authors.
The inequality-based critiques consider Gender Justice analytically
application of Rawls' liberal principles can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of
our society." Okin, Justice and Gender, 16 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 42,44 (1987). Rawls is not the only
liberal who deviates from inequality theorists' caricature of liberalism. See S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN
CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 3, 241-61 (1984) (arguing that Constant's
ideas are not injured by criticisms of liberalism's emphasis on private rights and blindness to social
context); Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REv. 826, 835 n.39
(1988) (criticizing MacKinnon's remarks about liberalism as "too casual" because she identifies all
of liberalism with the ideas of a narrow aspect of that school of thought).
77. Scales, supra note 62, at 1389 (footnote omitted).
78. Finley, supra note 4.
79. Burns, supra note 3.
80. Menkei-Meadow, supra note 6.
81. Fishkin, supra note 5.

HeinOnline -- 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1392 1988

GENDER JUSTICE

1988]

1393

flawed because it emphasizes decontextualized autonomy. According to
these writers, the book fails to recogniZe that gender roles and other societal pressures greatly affect the significance of choice. 82 For example,
Professor Finley argues that a truly free society requires "far more than
refrain[ing] from interfering with existing 'choices' that grow out of the
currently prevailing power structure, roles, and expectations of our society."83 Professor Bums similarly criticizes the book for its failure to recognize pervasive discrimination in society's distribution of resources and
opportunities: "At home and at work, by embedded cultural meanings
and practices, women generally are secondary to men." 84 Finally, for
Professor Menkel-Meadow Gender Justice and its liberty-enhancing
model fall back on "several old, liberal, middle-class, white, and male
saws-choice, 'equal liberty,' individualism, process, freedom, and
autonomy ...." 85
Inequality-based critiques thus reject Gender Justice's reliance on
free choice as the source of reform. Professor Menkel-Meadow points to
actual social conditions that formnlate choices, and asks, "Can a woman
who does not have sufficient education to 'freely choose' between American achievement on the job and traditional familial socialization to get
married, have children, and stay home really be considered as having
expressed a choice?" 86 Indeed, both Menkel-Meadow and Finley
recount personal experiences that illustrate problems with Gender Justice's concept of choice. Professor Menkel-Meadow discusses a woman
in her exercise class having a breast enlargement "because to her husband and to herself she was 'nothing' with her small breasts. " 87 Professor Finley speaks of a friend's young daughter "already attuned to the
dangers and difficulties of breaking out of conventional social roles" in
her desire to be a stewardess and not a pilot. 88 Professor Fishkin, while
not explicitly endorsing the inequality model, also criticizes Gender Justice for its reliance on choice. He argues that because women operate at
such a disadvantage, choice is illusory and outcomes must be scrutinized
to ensure fair process. 89
Menkel-Meadow and Finley also disavow Gender Justice's endorsement of the public-private distinction. As Menkel-Meadow asserts,
82. Finley, supra note 4, at 940-41.
83. Id. at 943; see also id. at 923 ("Is there any role in the liberty theory for moral outrage over
•.. the many other indignities faced by women?").
84. Burns, supra note 3, at 1795; see also id. at 1794 (criticizing the authors' adherence to the
liberal model despite the conflicting goal of "achieving genuine gender equality").
85. Menkei-Meadow, supra note 6, at 259.
86. Id. at 265.

87.

Id.

88. Finley, supra note 4, at 932 n.87.
89. See Fishkin, supra note 5, at 1448-49.
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"[w]hat well-schooled feminist aspires to a government policy that perpetuates sharp market-family distinctions and leaves individuals 'free' to
do as they will, in a present world largely constructed out of past 'official'
policies which largely pre-ordain those 'choices'?" 90 Given this view of
reality, Finley advocates the attainment of fundamental political and
social change through "[g]lobal attention to the intricate interweavings
of family, market, and politics ... .'' 91
The debunking of liberal thinking-rather than an assessment of
Gender Justice within the context of liberal ideology-is the raison d'etre
of all four reviews. Professor Menkel-Meadow recommends the book,
"but only if you want to see where you belong in a world constructed by
a limited liberal vision." 92 Professor Burns is pained by the authors' failure to consider adequately contemporary feminist thinkers, and argues
that such consideration might have made the authors' own analysis
"more thoughtful and self-aware.'' 93 Professor Finley likewise finds fault
with the book because it "seems barely touched by the recent profusion
of feminist writings on gender issues." 94 Professor Fishkin's review,
meanwhile, presents a summary critique of the book's process-based
liberalism. 95
Gender Justice is criticized for two generalizations that set the tone
of its analysis: I) the liberty-enhancing model is sufficient to overcome
past discrimination because "[r]ules governing the conduct of women
were adopted in what was honestly seen as women's best interest" (p.
30); and 2) the "leftist feminist" theory is too deterministic to contribute
to the liberty-enhancing model (p. 48). Finley criticizes these propositions because she believes that a theory of gender justice must include
"analysis of the ways in which women are oppressed [in order to understand] how the options, choices, and dignity of women have been systematically constrained by their powerless positions throughout history.'' 96
That a book is either incomplete in its consideration of a topic or
inadequate to the task of drawing meaning from some phenomenon certainly are appropriate grounds for criticism. 97 Gender Justice's critics do
90. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 260; see also Burns, supra note 3, at 1797 (arguing that
women's individual autonomy and ability to make free choices is impaired in a culture that often
places them in precarious economic circumstances).
91. Finley, supra note 4, at 918.
92. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 272.
93. Burns, supra note 3, at 1816; see also id. at 1793 n.9 (criticizing Gender Justice's failure to
discuss feminist interpretations of Supreme Court sex discrimination cases).
94. Finley, supra note 4, at 915.
95. See Fishkin, supra note 5, at 1445-50.
96. Finley, supra note 4, at 934.
97. Indeed, I have written critical reviews along these lines. See Devins, Defining Effective
Civil Rights Enforcement in Education, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1986) (reviewing M. REDELL &
A. BLOCK, EQUALITY AND EDUCATION (1985)); Devins, Centralization in Education: Why Joilnny
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more than this, however. By portraying the book as an exemplar of liberalism's larger failure, Gender Justice's fate is effectively sealed from the
start. Since repudiation of the liberal vision underlies much of contemporary feminist thought, it is understandable that Gender Justice provokes strong negative feelings. 98
This is not to say that Gender Justice is a perfect book-far from it.
Many of the criticisms leveled at the book attack not only the premises of
the authors' model, but also its application. As revealed by the discussion in the balance of this Part, some of these narrow criticism$ are
poignant. 99
The narrow criticisms of Gender Justice are mostly directed at the
authors' approval of various gender-specific classifications. For example,
the authors argue that in some instances sex-segregated public schools
are justified because they "afford a richer mix of choices to everyone"
(pp. 106-07). However, Bums argues that dramatic differences in the
quality of education and prestige of diplomas exist at such schools. 100
Similarly, Finley criticizes Gender Justice's apparent approval of differential disability benefits for "voluntary" pregnancy as "entrench[ing] the
stereotypical and choice-constraining views of women's place in the
home." 101 Finally, Bums contends that the authors' endorsement of differential retirement ages for men and women under the Social Security
Act (pp. 102-03) fails to search out less gender-specific altematives. 102
The reviewers also criticize Gender Justice's recognition of actual
sex differences. For example, while the authors feel that differences
between men's and women's life expectations justify sex-based differences
in pension and life insurance plans (p. 114), critics note that reduced
pension payments unfairly constrain the choices of retired women. 103
Likewise, integrating women into the workforce may adversely affect
Can't Spell Bureaucracy, (Book Review), 75 CALIF. L. REv. 759 (1987) (reviewing D. KIRP & D.
JENSEN, SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION
(1986)).
98. Not only does the book espouse liberalism, but also it understates feminist concerns and
approves of various sex-based classifications in the name of natural differences and administrative
convenience. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
99. These reviews, on rare occasion; note meritorious features of the book. Professor MenkelMeadow describes as "generally laudable" the book's advocacy of "government support of many
different family forms." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 270. Professor Bums also supports some
of the book's analysis and proposals. See Bums, supra note 3, at 1793 n.15 (praising the authors for,
among other things, "insightful" criticism of Justice Rehnquist's gender decisions).
100. See Bums, supra note 3, at 1801-04. Bums' disagreement with the authors on this issue is
ultimately over priorities: "Excusing such sex segregation, with the explanation that the motivation
for it is to preserve educational 'choice' or 'diversity,' is to decide that separation of the sexes is more
important than affording full access to quality education regardless of sex." 1d. at 1804.
101. Finley, supra note 4, at 929.
102. Bums, supra note 3, at 1806-08.
103. Finley, supra note 4, at 925.
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their life expectancy. 104 Thus, the reviewers ridicule Gender Justice for
"discounting" women's changing social status 105 by imposing another
generation's social roles on today's working women. Correlatively, critics attack the authors' acceptance of administrative convenience as a justification for sex-based classifications, such as the military's previous
practice of automatically giving wives of servicemen dependents' benefits,
while requiring the husbands of servicewomen to prove dependency. 106
As Finley wryly observes, "[i]t is surprising that such strong individualists as the authors are not more suspicious about the use of statistical
generalizations that treat women as a class." 107
Finally, Gender Justice is criticized for resorting to arguments
beyond the scope of the liberty-enhancing model in order to avoid
reforms. For example, Finley notes that the authors' rejection of comparable worth is premised on their wariness of the accuracy of job evaluation systems, a position that has little to do with their liberty principle. 108
Such wariness is characterized as "hostility towards the transformation
of values and roles that is the deeper aspiration of the comparable worth
movement." 109
This sense of distrust and perceived hostility connects the narrow
criticisms of the book with the reviewers' broader complaints of liberalism's failure. For the reviewers, the combination of the authors' application of the liberty-enhancing model with their depiction of feminists as
"leftist" and "result oriented" (pp. 48-53) is too much. The reviewers
are not content merely to criticize Kirp, Yudof, and Franks as "bad"
liberals. Their attacks, instead, are designed to expose liberalism's nearly
inevitable support of the male-dominated status quo. The principal target of these reviewers then is the liberal model itself, not its application
by Kirp, Yudof, and Frank.

IV
AsSESSING GENDER JUSTICE

Gender Justice is an important, worthwhile, and flawed book. By
providing a literate, fast-moving, and thoughtful overview of an incredi104. See id. at 926; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 268 (noting that life expectancy is
not completely uncontrollable).
105. Finley, supra note 4, at 926.
106. See Bums, supra note 3, at 1809-10 (stating that the authors' emphasis on efficiency-based
distinctions is incompatible with "equal liberty"); see also Finley, supra note 4, at 924-25 (arguing
that such regulations invade the privacy-and thus liberty-of servicewomen by forcing them to
submit their family economic affairs to public scrutiny).
107. Finley, supra note 4, at 925.
108. !d. at 928.
109. ld.; see alsq Bums, supra note 3, at 1812 (suggesting that the authors' rejection of jobevaluation systems places "the cost and burden of overcoming historic discrimination entirely on
women").
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ble range of issues, the book serves as an excellent primer on gender justice. The authors' provocative applications of the liberty-enhancing
model encourage the reader to think through the issues (and even disagree with the authors). Their account of the causes of gender segregation
and their assessments of feminist thinking and the economic status of
women present a lively point of comparison for the reader. Also,
through its insistence that the liberty-enhancing model applies equally to
men and women, the book offers a new perspective on the concept of
gender justice. 110
Gender Justice does have three principal shortcomings, however.
First, in applying their free-choice model, the authors' calculus often
seems ill-founded. Second, their embrace of liberalism is not entirely
consistent. Finally, the authors fail to address adequately feminist thinking and the separation between public and private spheres. Discussion of
such issues as the Equal Rights Amendment, the rights of homosexuals,
and antipornography legislation would improve the book's comprehensiveness in this regard. This Part considers the significance of each of
these shortcomings.

A.

Ill-founded Calculations

Kirp, Yudof, and Franks' application of their liberty-enhancing
model does not always seem reasonable. This is especially the case in
those instances where the authors approve of sex segregation. Critics of
the book are therefore correct in questioning the authors' approval of sex
segregation in education, pension payments, and pregnancy-related disability. 111 Such segregation does not enhance choice; it limits it. Sex segregation in education, as Sarah Burns and others have shown, may well
constrain or foreclose opportunities to enter select fields of employment. 112 Disparities in pension payments, as Lucinda Finley has argued,
improperly presume that women's changing role in the work force will
not affect life expectancies. 113 Finally, pregnancy-related disability110. Gender Justice, while broadening the focus of the sex equality issue, pays little attention to
the manner in which males seek to assume traditionally female roles. For example, men have been
somewhat successful in challenging laws which-for the purposes of custody determinations-view
women as primary caretakers. For more comprehensive treatments of this issue, see Law, supra note
51, at 987-1002 {discussing Supreme Court decisions reviewing laws that discriminate against men);
Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 69-70 (discussing sex discrimination suits brought by
men).
11 I. See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
112. Bums, supra note 3, at 1800-05.
113. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. Finley observes:
If a retired woman receives less in pension payments each month than the man she worked
alongside for an equal number of years, isn't her liberty being constrained in relation to
his? ... To say that she may live longer than her male co-worker, and thus may receive the
same or more over the long run is no answer to the choice-constraining standard-of-living
problem ....
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while perhaps not entitled to special beneficent treatment 114-clearly
should not be singled out for unfavorable treatment. Whether or not
pregnancy is voluntary, it is a condition that limits a woman's
opportunities.
Gender Justice does not hinge on such calculations, however. Kirp,
Yudof, and Franks freely admit that the liberty-enhancing model is subject to variable application, dependent in part on one's values and other
circumstances surrounding a particular issue. For example, in their
assessment of military dependents' benefits, the authors are unable to
determine whether administrative convenience or sexual stereotyping
concerns should prevail (pp. 114-15). The linchpin of this ambivalence is
that the military's sexist presumption may be "almost universally true"
(p. 115). This particular calculation is troubling; it is disingenuous to
suggest that the sex-stereotyping of women as secondary wage earners
can secure "fair processes rather than particular outcomes" (p. 12). Nevertheless, value-based variability in results is not inherently bothersome.
Many other situations can be imagined in which thoughtful people
would disagree as to whether a particular outcome furthers or undermines gender equality. For example, although the court in the Baby M
litigation declared surrogacy contracts void, 115 one may argue that disallowing such contracts improperly denies women the ability to earn
money through such endeavors. Yet enforcing such contracts creates an
irrebuttable presumption that the child's best interests cannot be served
by a custody decision favoring the mother. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks'
proposal is not the only one that raises the spectre of inconsistent application. Sylvia Law's and Catherine MacKinnon's proposals both hinge
on determinations of what is oppressive to women-determinations that
are often subjective and unclear. Indeed, any proposal not hinged to a
fixed rule (for example, gender distinctions are always pernicious) is necessarily subject to varying application.
Critics should not focus too much attention on the authors' use of
the liberty-enhanciqg model. Their calibrations are best understood as a
device to think through the application of the free-choice model and not
as distinct social policy proposals. In fact, because Gender Justice
advances a comprehensive methodology, the authors need not produce
overwhelming evidence demonstrating the soundness of each recommendation. The authors can instead move from issue to issue, concerned
only that they frame the question in accordance with their analytical
model.
The authors' methodology serves Gender Justice well. Their
Finley, supra note 4, at 925.
114. See generally supra notes 47-61.
115. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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detailed application of the free-choice model leaves the reader with substantially more than an abstract moral imperative. Furthermore, using
this latitude, the book highlights the range of issues that define gender
justice. As stated in the introduction, "Because gender influences so
many aspects of our lives, policies that ostensibly aren't about gender at
all nonetheless have evident relevance" (p. 1).
The broad focus of Gender Justice is a breakthrough, for conceptions of gender inequality have changed dramatically. Consider the following: Prior to December 1977, t4e Social Security Act demanded that
men-but not women-seeking spousal benefits demonstrate dependency
on their wage earner wives for one-half of their support. 116 Whom did
this classification injure, the surviving male spouse who was denied benefits or put through an additional procedural obstacle, or the female wage
earner whose income provided less protection to her family than that of
her husbandJ 117 The answer, of course, is that the classification injured
both. The couple's relationship is symbiotic, and thus, so must be the
effect of the Act. With 23 million households now dependent on the
earnings of working wives, 118 the life choices of both men and women are
greatly affected by women's access to traditionally male-dominated professions, as well as pregnancy leave, day care, pay equity, and a range of
other issues. Consequently, gender equality is no longer solely a question
116. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
117. See Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of
Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1985).
118. See Fader, Men Lose Freedom if Women Lose Ground, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 22, col.
3 (discussing benefits to men married to women with salaried jobs). This fact, of course, does not
mean that wage parity exists between men and women. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks recognize the wage
gap, noting that "in several critical respects, women are not men's equal in the marketplace" and
that in addition to the exercise of choice, "[d]iscrimination is at work in the creation of the wage
gap" (pp. 144-45). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE
FOR THE SO's (1984) (discussing wage gap and comparable worth doctrine); Hantzis, Is Gender
Justice a Completed Agenda? (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REv. 690 (1987) (discussing condition
of women in the marketplace).
The adequacy of liberal antidiscrimination measures is the remaining question. Kirp, Yudof,
and Franks feel these measures are sufficient (p. 172). However, proponents of comparable worth
and statistical measures of discrimination disagree. See Hartman, Pay Equity for Women: Wage
Discrimination and the Comparable Worth Controversy in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 167 (R. Fullinwider & C. Mills eds. 1986); Finley, supra note 4, at 937-40 (discussing
statistical proofs of discrimination).
Comparable worth is significant on another level. Feminists critical of the current liberal model
are divided on this issue. For example, Catherine MacKinnon apparently rejects comparable worth
reforms. As divined by Cass Sunstein in her analysis of MacKinnon's work: "By increasing salaries
in traditional female jobs, comparable worth remedies might reinforce women's preferences for those
jobs or distort the employment market." Sunstein, supra note 76, at 838. In contrast, Christine
Littleton argues that "[e]quality as acceptance makes the broad[] claim that all behavioral forms
that the culture (not just the employer) has encoded as 'male' and 'female' counterparts should be
equally rewarded." Littleton, supra note 36, at 1312.
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of women's rights. 119 Instead, the focus must be on the status of both
men and women, and on the existence of artificially imposed distinctions
between them.
Gender Justice's critics find its broad methodology troublesome.
Noting that outcomes are determined by "what factors are selected for
emphasis and who is evaluating the relative strengths of the respective
liberties," Finley argues that the liberty-enhancing model may "simply
be an invitation for the perspective and preferences of the traditionally
powerful to triumph once again." 1 ~0 This criticism is similar to inequality theorists' contention that liberalism is not value-neutral, but in fact
presupposes and perpetuates male-dominated norms. 121 In other words,
this criticism is not so much about the book as about liberalism.
Liberals are willing to risk such unjust application either because
they believe that the locus of decisionmaking is properly lodged in the
individual 122 or because they fear that special treatment will ultimately
prove harmful to the benefited class. 123 Moreover, the proposals of inequality feminists are equally fraught with the danger of subjective application. 124 For example, in urging such a standard of review Professor
MacKinnon fails to appreciate that the "determination of what reinforces or undermines a sex-based underclass is exceedingly difficult." 125
Consider the cases of Kahn v. Shevin, 126 upholding a small tax
exemption for widows as compensation for past discrimination, and
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 127 allowing Navy servicewomen more time than
their male counterparts to seek a promotion due to their exclusion from
119. In a series of cases dealing with unwed fathers, the Supreme Court has ruled that such men
must "earn" their custodial rights. Distinguishing between "a mere biological relationship and an
actual relationship of parental responsibility," the Court has held that the "significance of the
biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 259-60, 262 (1983).
Consequently, irrebuttable presumptions denying an unwed father any right to custody once the
mother dies are invalid, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), as are laws which deny to an unwed
father (but not an unwed mother) veto power over his child's adoption. Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979). On the other hand, statutes which place substantial obstacles in front of an unwed
father are permissible. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (unwed father need not possess
absolute veto power over adoption); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (unwed father must comply with
state procedures to preserve right to object to adoption). Gender Justice would benefit from a
discussion of this body of case law. See supra note 110.
120. Finley, supra note 4, at 931; see also id. at 924 (arguing that what is liberty-enhancing
depends upon the outcome desired).
121. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
123. See, e.g., Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 28, at 196-97 (summarizing
disadvantages of the special treatment model in the context of pregnancy and maternity policy).
124. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
125. Law, supra note 51, at 1005; see also Taub, supra note 63, at 1691 (criticizing MacKinnon
on these grounds).
126. 416 u.s. 351 (1974).
127. 419 u.s. 498 (1975).
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sea duty. Professor MacKinnon lauds these decisions for implicitly recognizing that sex discrimination cumulatively penalizes women based on
their differences from men. 128 Yet, as Nadine Taub has recognized, these
decisions can be criticized "because the crude brand of compensation
they purport to offer women is both inadequate and a distraction from
the real problems women face." 129 Moreover, Taub has suggested, and
MacKinnon must recognize, that it is exceedingly unlikely that a supposedly male-dominated court system can successfully apply MacKinnon's
suggested standard of review. 130
Gender Justice's miscalculations, while disappointing, do not undermine the liberty-enhancing model. The critical question is whether,
given a liberal model, its proposal offers a useful approach to reducing
gender injustice. The validity of liberalism itself is not a question that
Gender Justice purports to answer (p. 4). The book presupposes that the
liberal model, with its emphasis on autonomy, is appropriate.
B.

Gender Justice and the Liberal Vision

The authors' emphasis on the benevolence of male domination and
its concomitant delineation of racial and gender justice raises doubts
about the book's fidelity to the liberal vision. Presumably, if the authors'
perception that sex segregation is rooted in paternalism were shaken,
they instead might advocate an interventionist strategy.
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks argue that "women were victimized by
policies designed to protect them-policies that, for this very reason,
denied them the chance to make basic decisions for themselves" (p.
29). 131 Although this vision is highly critical, the authors incorrectly
conclude that the husband-wife relationship is analogous to parent-child,
not owner-slave. While laws affecting a woman's earnings and working
conditions can be justified as beneficent paternalism, 132 many other gen128. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 63, at 116-17.
129. Taub, supra note 63, at 1692.
130. Id. at 1691-92.
131. As this part will demonstrate, the authors are clearly mistaken in suggesting that benelicent
paternalism is the source of sex segregation. See infra text accompanying notes 130-137. The

obviousness of this mistake is bothersome. It suggests that the liberty-enhancing approach is
premised on an optimistic assessment of women's present condition. At this level, the libertyenhancing model can be criticized as little more than a smoke screen for a diminished governmental
role in addressing gender issues. I believe that Gender Justice's critics would argue that the authors'
conclusion that most sex discrimination was "benevolent" illustrates their inability to develop an
acceptable theory of gender justice. My view is somewhat different. I strongly feel that the authors
are truly committed in principle to their liberty-enhancing model. For me, their line drawing
between race and gender discrimination, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, is best
understood as a tacit recognition that as applied the liberty-enhancing model is subject to attack.
132. Some evidence even suggests that there is reason to question the beneficence of protective
labor legislation. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 247-68 (1975) (discussing actual negative effects of such legislation).
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der-specific classifications are not amenable to such justification. Under
the common law, where divorce was impossible, the wife was always her
husband's chattel. I33 The children of the relationship were always to be
in the father's custody (p. 184), I34 the husband controlled the domicile
(pp. 177-78), and, if the wife was involved in an adulterous relationship,
the husband could sue her lover for infringing on his property rights to
her fidelity. I35
Differences between husband-wife and parent-child relationships are
also exemplified by the conflicting legal standards governing marital rape
and child abuse. As of 1984, forty states retained some form of marital
exemption for rape. I36 These laws derive from the common law notion
that "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon
his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." 137 In sharp contrast, laws that allow the state to take custody of children date back to the sixteenth century.I 38 These laws, first
enacted in this country in the nineteenth century, are grounded in the
state's parens patriae authority to ensure a certain modicum of care in the
upbringing of children. I39 This power presumes both an independent
state interest in the well-being of children and that the right to parental
custody may be limited by the child's age and the nature of parental care.
I do not contend that the husband-wife relationship is analogous to
that of owner-slave. But beneficent paternalism is an inadequate justification for differing theories of justice for women and racial minorities.
Moreover, since Gender Justice claims that justice ensures fair processes
rather than particular outcomes, it is unclear why the authors' analysis of
gender issues varies significantly from their approach to race. Consider133. See generally Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School
Curriculum, and Developments Towards Equality. 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1972) (discussing
unequal treatment of married women).
134. See Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 688-91 (Ala. 1981) (describing evolution of genderbased presumptions affecting custody).
135. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 654-60 (1930)
(discussing the tort of "criminal conversation"); Kavanagh, Alienation of Affection and Criminal
Conversation: Unholy Matrimony in Need of Annulment. 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 323 (1981) (discussing
torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affection).
136. See generally Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption From Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7 VT. L.
REv. 33 (1982).
137. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 162,474 N.E.2d 567,572,485 N.Y.S.2d 207,212 (1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985) (quoting 1 HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629).
Protecting marital privacy and encouraging reconciliation are the contemporary justifications. I d. at
165, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
138. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role In
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases. 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 894-910 (1975) (summarizing history of child
neglect laws).
139. See Devins, A Constitutional Right to Home Instruction?, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 435, 443-56
(1984).
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ing the authors' firm opposition to quotas (p. 136) 140 and their support of
both process-based affirmative action (recruitment, training) (pp. 134-35)
and the vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws (p. 153), their
visions of gender and racial justice should be parallel. The authors' suggestion that they are building upon a conception of justice therefore
seems misleading. Instead, because the authors build their proposal
around the "beneficent" character of gender classifications, varying conceptions of women's status-not visions of justice-explain the principal
differences between Gender Justice and the naturalist and feminist perspectives it criticizes.
C.

Comprehensiveness

Kirp, Yudof, and Franks forthrightly acknowledge in their introduction that their "aim is to test an argument and not to produce an
encyclopedia; along the way, some matters of substantive importance
undoubtedly receive short shrift" (p. 4). This is true in light of Gender
Justice's failure to give fuller treatment to failed efforts to ratify the equal
rights amendment and the controversy over antipornography legislation.
These issues, in varying ways, reflect divisions both within the feminist
community and between feminist and nonfeminist women.
Recent studies of the ERA demonstrate that conflict between feminists and homemakers was a principal cause of the amendment's
demise. 141 Recognition of these studies would bolster Gender Justice's
conclusion that choice plays a large role in understanding women's social
status.
Discussion of the antipornography debate also would fit nicely in
the book. This debate sets inequality feminists, who view pornography
as part of "the power of men over women in society," 142 against civil
libertarians and equality feminists. 143 On this issue, inequality feminists
live up to their deterministic caricature by advocating "[t]he paternalistic
notion that women can never freely consent to pose for sexually explicit
pictures or films." 144 In an ironic twist, antipornography efforts also fit
the interventionist naturalist caricature, for such legislation has been
140. For the authors, "quotas withhold from individuals the right of self-determination that is
critical for self-respect" (p. 136).
141. J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE Losr THE ERA 98-112, 216 (1986). See generally Rhode,
Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1 LAW & INEQUALITY 1 (1983).
142. C. MACKINNON, supra note 36, at 5; see also Sunstein, supra note 74, at 840-46 (describing
and assessing MacKinnon's writings on pornography).
143. See WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (V. Burstyn ed. 1985); see also Shrossen, The
Convergence of Feminist and Civil Liberties Principles in the Pornography Debate (Book Review), 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987).
144. Shrossen, supra note 143, at 210.
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championed by those who wish to " 'restore ladies to what they used to
be.' ,14s
Gender Justice could also have been enhanced by discussing the
rights of homosexuals. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
such as antisodomy statutes and the prohibition of homosexual marriages, deserves mention because it raises the fundamental question of
what role-if any-social norms should play in limiting the free-choice
model. 146 Although such an exploration necessarily raises knotty issues,
the sweep and risks of free-choice requires such a full exploration.
Otherwise, the many guideposts set up by the application of the freechoice model are not fully instructive.
More troubling is the authors' failure to recognize the difficulties of
maintaining a public-private distinction. While the authors recognize
both the breadth of gender policy and that "[t]he boundary between public and private is blurred" (p. 17), they fail to consider whether the separation of public and private spheres makes sense when the state controls
the intimate details of family life. Until twenty years ago, domestic relations laws were exclusively based on sexual stereotypes. For example,
there was a presumption in favor of maternal custody, 147 courts could
award alimony only to the wife, 148 and unwed fathers had no parental
rights. 149
The evolution of equal protection and due process review has undermined some of the force of such presumptions. Yet marriage and family
remain essentially state-sanctioned relationships. 150 In fact, in cases limiting the scope of the spousal testimonial privilege 151 and rejecting a
requirement of spousal consent to abortion, 152 the Supreme Court did
not base its decisions on the rights of a spouse as an individual. 153
Instead, the Court emphasized that, before limiting the spousal testimo145. Duggan, Hunter & Vance, False Promises: Feminist Antipornography Legislation in the
U.S., in WoMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 143, at 133 (quoting legislative sponsor of
antipornography bill).
146. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted (holding
that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis); cf. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy statute).
147. See supra note 134.
148. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding such laws unconstitutional).
149. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding statutory denial of hearing on fitness
to unwed fathers unconstitutional).
150. For a defense of preferred legal status for-and insulation of-marriage, see Hafen, The

Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983).
151. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (holding that witness spouse alone can
assert privilege to refuse to testify).
152. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1978).
153. The Court in Danforth nevertheless recognized that concern for the pregnant woman's
right of privacy supported its rnling. /d. at 70 n.ll.
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nial privilege, the marriage must be in such disrepair that it is beyond
preservation. 154 This notion also underlies contemporary no-fault
divorce, where-in theory--divorce is awarded only if the state is convinced that the marriage is irreparable. 155
The question of where to draw the line separating public from private concerns still remains. 156 Of course, one can reject-as inequality
feminists do-the drawing of such lines. 157 Gender Justice's libertyenhancing model avoids this issue. While we are told that sex-based presumptions governing custody and domicile are improper {pp. 183-86),
that settlement agreements should be used in the dissolution of marriage
{p. 183), and that husbands shonld have some voice in the abortion decision {p. 111), the book never relates these concerns to some larger conception of the public and private spheres. Although the authqrs argue
that the spheres should remain separate, they never confront the complexity and pervasiveness of this disjunction.
Finally, Kirp, Yudof, and Franks err in describing feminist thinking
in sweeping terms. Perhaps, for their purposes, such an approach made
sense because they sought merely to explain that by rejecting the liberal
model, leftist feminists must embrace deterministic government intervention {pp. 48-61). By mischaracterizing feminist thought, however, the
authors touched a nerve in the feminist community, as evidenced by the
highly critical reviews attacking the book on this count. 158 This resnlt
was unfortunate for it has obscured the debate over the many important
issues raised by the book.
CONCLUSION

Gender Justice, despite its limitations, is a worthwhile contribution
to gender jurisprudence. Its broad view of gender-based policy frees the
reader from the traditional equation of gender policy with women's
rights. Using the liberty-enhancing model, Gender Justice offers salient
information and insights on an unexpectedly wide range of significant
policy questions. Granted, the book does not fulfill its promise of
advancing a theory of justice. But, when viewed as a starting point for
154. "When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceedingwhatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in
the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
155. See THE 1966 REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S CoMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, reprinted in J.
AREEN, FAMILY LAW 267-70 (2d ed. 1985). For an analysis of the detrimental impact of no-fault
divorce and other reforms on women's economic status, see L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION 15-51 (1985).
156. See generally Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982) (comparing political support for the
dichotomy with legal scholarship challenging its legitimacy).
157. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
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understanding gender-based policy, Gender Justice admirably serves its
purpose.
It is unfortunate that reviewers have used the book as a vehicle to
attack liberal thinking. 159 Admittedly, Gender Justice invites such criticism through trivialization .of feminist thinking and its approval of some
sex-based classifications. But Gender Justice should not be judged solely
on the applications of its liberty-enhancing model. It is intended as an
opening round in a dialogue, not as a be-ali-and-end-all to thinking on
this subject. Ironically, the very ferocity of its critics may ultimately further the book's purpose by drawing attention to Gender Justice and the
debate about sexual equality.

159. In suggesting that Gender Justice has been treated unfairly, I do not mean to insinuate-by
way of contrast-that critics have widely praised the works of inequality feminists. Catherine
MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified, for example, has been subject to fairly critical review. See
Bartlett, supra note 36, at 1566 ("MacKinnon's faith in some authentic reality of womanhood that
will emerge once women have thrown off the yoke of male domination is in direct contradiction to
her heavy reliance upon the role of social construction in explaining male hegemony."). Even
authors sympathetic to MacKinnon's views find some deficiencies in her analysis. See, e.g., Colker,
Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U.L.
REV. 217, 250 (1988) ("MacKinnon [improperly] discounts descriptions of [women's] freedom but
not subordination"); Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on
Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 352, 379-80 (1988) (MacKinnon "overlooks the
incredible strength, and creative ability to nurture hope ... that women have displayed throughout
history."); Sunstein, supra note 76, at 830 (criticizing a generally praiseworthy book for relying on
"discussion [that] is sometimes too polemieal").
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